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Abstract
This paper analyzes how a privacy regulation restricting data disclosure af-
fects quality investment by a monopoly service provider—who derives revenues
solely from disclosing user data to third parties—and social welfare. In our model,
a user’s gross utility from the service depends on its quality and the amount of
information disclosed. We show that in a fully covered market, the regulation
reduces quality investment but may still be socially desirable when quality and
information are not strong complements from consumers’ perspective. In a par-
tially covered market, the regulation may raise quality and social welfare even
when quality and information are highly complementary.
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1 Introduction
Data has often been called the oil of the digital era—a highly valuable resource and
a force of change and growth. Unlike oil, however, data can be “extracted, refined,
valued, bought and sold in different ways” (The Economist, May 6, 2017). These
exploitation activities frequently intrude on consumer privacy and occur without the
knowledge or consent of the consumers who supply the resource. Regulators in many
jurisdictions have, in response, sought to protect consumer privacy by requiring firms
to obtain consumers’ informed consent for the collection and use of their data, impos-
ing fines on firms that fail to comply.1 But in a world increasingly dominated by big
tech firms, such consent is not always voluntary. The typical take-it-or-leave-it offers
made by these firms give consumers no meaningful choice, particularly in the absence
of good alternatives to the services that these firms provide: consumers have to either
consent or forgo using these services altogether. This implies that big tech firms can
use their market power to impose “abusive” privacy policies, the same way traditional
dominant firms are able to impose “excessive” prices. For instance, in February 2019,
the German competition authority ruled that some of Facebook’s data practices consti-
tuted “exploitative abuse”and ordered the firm to curtail or end these practices within
a year.2 The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also renewed its calls
for a national privacy law that would “regulate how big tech companies [...] collect and
handle user data” (Kang, 2019).
One way to prevent abusive data practices by big tech firms is through regulatory
restrictions on the ways these firms collect and use consumer data. This approach has
received support from leading privacy advocates, many of whom believe that such reg-
ulatory mandates would have more a meaningful impact on the data practices of big
tech firms compared to fines for privacy violations.3 Critics, however, argue that these
restrictions would reduce the returns to a firm’s investment in quality (or innovation),
1See for instance the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The full text of the
regulation is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
32016R0679&from=EN.
2For more details on the Facebook antitrust case, see https://www.npr.org/2019/
02/07/692312687/facebook-cant-gather-users-data-from-other-websites-german-
antitrust-office-says and https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/
Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.html.
3Advocates including Matt Stoller, a fellow at the Open Markets Institute, and Ashkan Soltani, a
former chief technology officer at the FTC, voiced their support for these regulatory mandates in a New
York Times article published on April 24, 2019. The article is available at https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/04/24/technology/facebook-ftc-fine-privacy.html?searchResultPosition=3.
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thereby stifling the firm’s investment incentives. For example, research has shown how
restricting data collection for ad targeting purposes can lower advertising effectiveness
and consequently, ad revenues (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011). If the dominant firm’s
operations are primarily ad-financed, this reduction in revenues may dampen its in-
centives to invest and innovate (Castor, 2010; Thierer, 2010; Athey, 2014). Do more
stringent privacy regulations necessarily weaken a dominant firm’s incentives to invest
and innovate? How would such regulations affect social welfare? Our paper aims to
shed light on these questions.
We consider a setup that corresponds closely to the business model of many dom-
inant tech firms (particularly social media platforms) in which users “pay with [their]
data and [their] attention”.4 In our model, a monopolist offers a free service to con-
sumers and derives revenues by disclosing user data to third parties (e.g., for targeting
ads). Prior to interacting with the consumers, the monopolist sets its privacy policy
(a disclosure level)5 and decides how much to invest in the quality of its service. The
firm’s quality and disclosure levels are observed by consumers, who then decide whether
to use the service (e.g., whether to create a social media account) and how much infor-
mation to provide when using it (e.g., how much to reveal about themselves on their
social media page; how many posts to write and photos to share). Consumers derive
higher gross utility when the firm’s service quality is higher (e.g., when a social media
platform provides more features and better sharing tools) and when they provide more
information. Further, they perceive quality and information to be complements (e.g.,
the better a platform’s sharing tools, the more information consumers share). Although
the monopolist’s service is free, consumers incur idiosyncratic privacy costs, which could
be due to their intrinsic preference for privacy or potential adverse market outcomes
(such as price discrimination and unwanted ads) that they may face as a result of the
firm’s disclosure of their personal information.6
We analyze the social desirability of a privacy regulation which takes the form of a
(binding) cap on data disclosure in this setting. The cap could correspond to a set of
restrictions on the purposes for which data may be disclosed or the types of third parties
4The quote was taken from Facebook co-founder Chris Hughes’ opinion piece on the New York Times
which appeared on May 9, 2019: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-
hughes-facebook-zuckerberg.html?module=inline
5For the sake of exposition, the disclosure level is defined in our model as the share of third parties
the monopolist discloses personal information to. However, as discussed later, it can also be interpreted
as an inverse measure of other (self-imposed) restrictions on the disclosure of data (e.g., regarding the
type or share of data disclosed).
6See Acquisti et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion of privacy costs.
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with whom data may be shared.7 Besides directly reducing consumers’ privacy costs, a
disclosure cap also generates a (strategic) change in the firm’s quality investment, which
raises social welfare when it is positive and lowers it otherwise. Therefore, the social
desirability of the cap depends (partly) on its impact on the firm’s quality investment.
A cap on disclosure affects the monopolist’s incentives to invest in quality by al-
tering its disclosure revenues, and therefore its gains from quality investment. The
monopolist invests in quality to attract more consumers to use its service (extensive
margin effect) and/or to induce current users to share more on the platform (intensive
margin effect); both of which increase the stock of information it can monetize. A cap
on disclosure reduces the firm’s gain from monetizing an additional unit of information.
Consequently, for a given number of users, the cap lowers the firm’s incentives to induce
users to share more data by investing in quality. This implies that in a fully covered
market where demand is effectively fixed, a disclosure cap will lead to lower quality
investment—the regulator faces a trade-off between privacy and quality. Despite this
trade-off, however, the cap is socially desirable when quality and information are not
strongly complementary. When the market is not fully covered (i.e., when some con-
sumers do not use the firm’s service), the cap affects the firm’s incentives to invest in
quality via two additional channels. First, the cap boosts demand for the firm’s service,
which increases its marginal benefit from investing in quality. Second, the cap alters the
way the firm’s demand responds to changes in quality. We find that a cap raises quality
investment when it substantially increases the sensitivity of demand to quality changes.
In this case, there is no privacy-quality trade-off and social welfare is unambiguously
higher under the cap. When the demand-sensitivity does not increase sufficiently, the
impact of the cap on quality further depends on the elasticity of demand with respect to
disclosure. The cap reduces quality level when demand is relatively disclosure-inelastic
and has an ambiguous effect otherwise. The overall social welfare impact of the cap is
ambiguous in both cases.
Our findings provide insights into the factors that a regulator should consider when
deciding whether to set restrictions on a dominant firm’s data disclosure policy. They
suggest, in particular, that the responsiveness of the firm’s demand to changes in quality
and disclosure levels are key determinants of the social desirability of such restrictions.
7U.S. regulations such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act forbid
the sharing of consumer information with non-affiliated third parties. Many countries also impose
restrictions on international transfers of data, allowing for them only if the foreign-based entity has an
adequate level of data protection.
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When demand is essentially unresponsive,8 restrictions on data disclosure are likely to
reduce quality investment. In this case, the regulator needs to weigh the negative ef-
fect of the cap on quality against its positive effect on consumer privacy. Our analysis
further shows that the outcome of this trade-off is driven by the complementarity be-
tween quality and information from consumers’ perspective. When the dominant firm’s
demand is responsive to changes in quality and/or disclosure, the regulator may not
always face a privacy-quality trade-off. In particular, if the disclosure cap substantially
raises the sensitivity of demand to changes in quality, the firm invests more in quality
under the cap, and the cap is therefore desirable.
Finally, we present two extensions to our model. First, we consider the scenario
where third parties (to which data are potentially disclosed) are heterogeneous in the
privacy costs that they induce on consumers. We find that a disclosure cap is more
likely to have a positive impact on quality when third parties are heterogeneous rather
than homogeneous. As a second extension, we explore the case where the regulator is a
consumer protection agency that cares only about consumer surplus. While the results
in this case do not qualitatively differ from those derived under a welfare-maximizing
regulator, we show that the consumer protection agency sets a lower disclosure cap.
Related literature. There is a growing pool of literature on the economics of
privacy.9 The extant literature has examined the impact of competition (Casadesus-
Masanell and Hervas-Drane, 2015; Dimakopoulos and Sudaric, 2018) and the effects
of taxation (Bloch and Demange, 2018; Bourreau et al., 2018) on the data disclosure
choices of a firm. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining the social desir-
ability of a direct intervention—a cap on disclosure. Our modeling approach is closest
to that of Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015). In both models, consumers
decide how much information to share with the firm, but not all information shared
is disclosed by the firm. In contrast, the other studies only examine the case of full
disclosure/exploitation. That said, we consider different revenue models: the firm de-
rives revenues solely from disclosure in our paper, whereas it can also charge a positive
price in Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015).10 More importantly, our work is
distinct from Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015) (and also, the other related
studies) in that we endogenize the firm’s quality choice. To the best of our knowledge,
8Consumers may however respond to changes in quality and/or privacy levels by changing the
amount of information they provide to the firm.
9See Section 2.3. of Acquisti et al. (2016) for a comprehensive survey of related privacy literature.
10In Section 7.6 we discuss the scenario in which consumers are charged positive prices in our setting.
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we are the first to examine from a theoretical perspective the relationship between a
firm’s data practices—more precisely, its disclosure level—and its incentives to invest in
quality. Understanding this relationship allows us to derive the impact of a disclosure
cap on investment in quality.11
Our analysis throws light on the privacy-innovation/quality debate. In particu-
lar, we find that a disclosure cap can increase quality level; i.e., there is not always a
privacy-quality trade-off. Our findings echo those of Anderson (2007), who shows that
an advertising cap may either decrease or increase the quality of free-to-air television.
However, his findings are driven entirely by the impact of the advertising cap on the
extensive margin effect of quality investment, as he considers only the (binary) partic-
ipation decision of consumers, whereas our results depend also on how quality affects
the amount of information provided by consumers (i.e., the intensive margin effect).12
The implications drawn from our analysis also complement the findings in the em-
pirical literature that examines the interlinkage between privacy regulations and data-
driven innovation. Goldfarb and Tucker (2012) analyze several empirical studies—in
the healthcare (see Tucker and Miller, 2009, 2011a and 2011b) and the online adver-
tising (see Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011) sectors—and find that privacy regulations may
raise the costs and/or lower the benefits associated with data-driven innovation, hence
weakening firms’ investment incentives. Our work shows, in addition, that a privacy
regulation can affect the level of service innovation (quality) even when data is not a
direct input for innovation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup.
Section 3 examines the consumers’ participation and information provision decisions
and Section 4 compares the privately and socially optimal choices of quality and disclo-
sure levels. Section 5 analyzes the impact of a disclosure cap on investment and social
welfare. Section 6 presents two extensions to our model: heterogeneous third parties
and consumer surplus maximization. Section 7 provides some general discussion and
Section 8 concludes. All omitted proofs can be found in Appendix A.
11Wickelgren (2015) and Campbell et al. (2015) also examine from a theoretical perspective the
effects of privacy regulation but they focus on its impact on competition.
12Moreover, we embed our study of the effect of a disclosure cap on quality in a comprehensive welfare
analysis, while Anderson (2007) does not investigate the overall welfare impact of an advertising cap.
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2 Baseline Model
Consider a firm that offers a service to a unit mass of consumers at a price of zero. The
firm derives revenues from disclosing its customers’ personal information to (a subset
of) third parties (e.g., advertisers or third-party apps) that are uniformly distributed
over the interval [0, 1]. The firm can choose the quality level q ≥ 0 of its service and
a disclosure level d ∈ [0, 1], which defines the extent to which personal information is
shared with third parties. More precisely, information is disclosed to the third parties
located in the interval [0, d] and not disclosed to those in (d, 1].13
Consumers’ utility. Consumers face a trade-off when sharing their personal in-
formation with the firm (or on the firm’s platform). When consumers share more
information with the firm, they obtain higher utility from its service but also suffer
higher privacy-related utility losses arising from the firm’s disclosure of consumer data
to third parties. These utility losses reflect the consumers’ preference for privacy, which
may arise because they value privacy intrinsically (e.g., as a right) or because they
may face potential adverse market-mediated outcomes (e.g., price discrimination).14 A
consumer’s privacy preference is captured by an idiosyncratic privacy cost parameter,
θ, which is increasing in the intensity of her preference. We assume that θ is distributed
over an interval
[
θ, θ¯
) ⊂ R+ according to a differentiable density function f(.).
The utility a consumer of type θ receives when she provides an amount of personal
information x ∈ [0, 1] is
U (x, θ, q, d) ≡ V (x, q)− θdx− αx−K, (1)
where V (x, q) is the gross utility the consumer derives from using the service, θdx is the
privacy cost she incurs when her information is disclosed to a share d of third parties,15
αx is the cost of sharing personal information (e.g. the time and effort it takes to
13As discussed later, our model allows for other interpretations of the disclosure level d.
14We acknowledge that data disclosure can also generate positive effects for consumers (e.g., better
targeted ads or a more customized newsfeed); however, we focus only on the negative effects in the
baseline setting since privacy regulations are only relevant when disclosure harms consumers. Alter-
natively, we can interpret the utility losses as losses net of any positive effects. We discuss in greater
detail the case where disclosure can have positive effects on consumer utility in Section 7.5.
15Our analysis would be qualitatively the same if the sharing of information with the monopolist also
imposed a privacy cost of λθx on the consumer where λ > 0. This would simply amount to replacing
d with d + λ in the baseline model. Note also that one can interpret d as the disclosure level above
a certain acceptance threshold (assumed to be the same for all consumers) as in Casadesus-Masanell
and Hervas-Drane (2015). This is justified by the fact that the firm will always choose a disclosure
level that is (weakly) above that threshold.
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upload photos onto the platform),16 and K > 0 is a fixed opportunity cost of using the
service.17 We further assume that V (x, q) is bounded, twice continuously differentiable,
increasing and concave in both its arguments. Note that the linearity of the privacy
cost θdx with respect to d rests on the implicit assumption that sharing personal data
with any third party induces the same privacy cost for a given consumer. In Section
6.1. we consider an extension where third parties induce heterogeneous privacy costs.
Value of personal information. We suppose that all the third parties interested
in consumers’ personal information have the same willingness to pay r > 0 for a unit
of information. In addition, we assume that the firm is a monopolist in the market
for (its customers’) personal information. These simplifying assumptions have two
straightforward implications. First, the firm always sets the unit price for access to
its customers’ personal information to r, independently of its other strategic choices.
Second, the monopolist fully extracts the surplus of the third-party data buyers. In
Section 7.2 we discuss the scenario in which third parties pay a price lower than r, thus
obtaining a positive surplus.
Firm’s profit and social welfare. Denote by x the function mapping each θ ∈[
θ, θ¯
)
to the amount of information x (θ) ∈ [0, 1] provided by a consumer of type θ.18
The firm’s profit is
Π (x,q, d) ≡ rd
θ¯∫
θ
x (θ) f (θ) dθ − C(q), (2)
where C(q) is the (fixed) cost of producing a service of quality level q. Assume that
C(.) is twice differentiable, with C(0) = 0, C(q) −→
q→+∞
+∞, C ′(0) = 0, C ′(q) > 0 and
C ′′ (q) > 0 for any q > 0. Social welfare is defined as the sum of the firm’s profit and
the consumers’ utility.
Before proceeding further, it is worth highlighting that the expressions of the firm’s
profit and the consumer’s utility functions (expressions (1) and (2)) allow for an alter-
native interpretation of our baseline model: we could assume that the firm discloses
a share d ∈ [0, 1] of the personal information provided by each consumer to all third
16An alternative interpretation of α is provided in Section 7.1.
17If K = 0, all consumers would find it (weakly) optimal to use the service (i.e., there would be no
extensive margin effect). This would make our model less rich and limit the insights we can draw from
it.
18The amount of information x (θ) can be equal to zero either because the consumer of type θ decides
not to use the service, or because she uses the service but decides to provide no personal information
at all.
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parties, instead of assuming that it discloses all the personal information provided by
consumers to a subset [0, d] of third parties.19
Interdependency between quality and information. We capture the inter-
dependency between quality and information from consumers’ perspective through the
following parameter:
γ ≡ −
∂2V
∂x∂q
∂2V
∂x2
,
which we assume to be constant for the sake of simplicity.20 Further, we focus on the
case where quality and information are complements from consumers’ perspective; i.e.,
γ > 0. This is the most interesting scenario for the purpose of our analysis and is
particularly relevant in the context of social media. For example, Facebook’s recent
introduction of new sharing tools (including Facebook Live video and the “On this
day” feature) in attempt to boost the sharing of original personal content provides
evidence that consumers view the quality of the social media platform and the amount
of information they share as complements.21 We discuss the case where quality and
information are substitutes, i.e. γ < 0, in Section 7.7.
Timing. We consider the following two-stage game:
1. The firm chooses a quality level q and commits to a disclosure level d.22
2. Consumers observe the levels of quality and disclosure. They decide then whether
to patronize the firm and, if they do, how much personal information to provide.
3 Consumers’ choice
We begin our analysis with the consumers’ problem. Conditional on patronizing the
firm, a consumer chooses her level of information provision so as to maximize her utility
19More generally, a lower disclosure level can be interpreted either as more (self-imposed) restrictions
on the type/share of data that can be disclosed to third parties and/or more restrictions on the set of
third parties that the data can be shared with.
20This amounts to restricting our attention to the class of gross utility functions V (x, q) for which
there exists a real number γ, a twice continuously differentiable function l(.), and a continuously
differentiable function h(.) such that V (x, q) = l(q) +
x∫
0
h(u− γq)du.
21For full story, visit https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-07/facebook-said-
to-face-decline-in-people-posting-personal-content.
22In a number of jurisdictions (e.g. Europe), firms can be heavily fined for a privacy policy breach,
which provides them with a credible commitment device. We discuss the way our results are affected
when firms are unable to commit to a disclosure level in Section 7.3.
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U (x, θ, q, d). Let us denote23
x˜ (θ, q, d) ≡ arg max
x∈[0,1]
U (x, θ, q, d) .
To ease the exposition, we assume throughout the paper that α > sup
q≥0
∂V
∂x
(1, q) and
θ¯ < inf
q≥0
∂V
∂x
(0, q). These conditions ensure that, conditional on using the service, the
amount of information that a consumer provides to the firm is always interior; i.e.,
x˜ (θ, q, d) ∈ (0, 1). The following lemma shows the effect of quality and disclosure levels
on the amount of personal information provided by a consumer.
Lemma 1 (Comparative statics - Information amount) Conditional on using the ser-
vice, the amount of information that a consumer provides to the firm is decreasing in
the disclosure level and the idiosyncratic privacy cost parameter but increasing in the
quality level. More precisely,
∂x˜
∂d
(θ, q, d) =
θ
∂2V
∂x2
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q)
< 0,
∂x˜
∂θ
(θ, q, d) =
d
∂2V
∂x2
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q)
< 0,
and
∂x˜
∂q
(θ, q, d) = γ > 0.
The above results are intuitive. An increase in the disclosure level or the value of
the consumer’s idiosyncratic privacy cost parameter raises her marginal privacy cost of
information provision; this leads her to provide less information. In contrast, an increase
in the quality level raises her marginal gross utility from providing information; hence,
she finds it optimal to provide more information.
We now consider the participation decision of a consumer. Denoting
U˜ (θ, q, d) ≡ U (x˜ (θ, q, d) , θ, q, d) ,
a consumer of type θ chooses to patronize the firm if and only if U˜ (θ, q, d) > 0.24 The
following lemma characterizes the demand for the service offered by the firm and shows
23The existence and uniqueness of x˜ (θ, q, d) follows from the fact that U (x, θ, q, d) is (strictly)
concave in x over the compact set [0, 1].
24For technical reasons, we assume that a consumer who is indifferent between patronizing the firm
or not decides not to patronize it.
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how it is affected by the levels of quality and disclosure.
Lemma 2 (Comparative statics - Demand) There exists a threshold θ˜ (q, d) ∈ [θ, θ¯]
such that a consumer patronizes the firm if and only if
θ < θ˜ (q, d) .
The threshold θ˜ (q, d) is weakly increasing in the quality level, but weakly decreasing in
the disclosure level. Moreover, whenever θ˜ (q, d) ∈ (θ, θ¯), the following expressions hold:
∂θ˜
∂q
(q, d) =
∂V
∂q
(x˜(θ˜ (q, d) , q, d), q)
dx˜(θ˜ (q, d) , q, d)
and
∂θ˜
∂d
(q, d) = − θ˜ (q, d)
d
.
The above lemma tells us that the demand for the service, which is given by
F (θ˜ (q, d)), is weakly increasing in the firm’s quality level but weakly decreasing in
its disclosure level.
4 Private versus social incentives
We now examine the privately and socially optimal choice of quality and disclosure
levels. Let us first consider the private incentives for quality investment and information
disclosure. The firm’s profit when consumers make their participation and information
provision decisions optimally is
Π˜ (q, d) = rd
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
x˜ (θ, q, d) f (θ) dθ − C(q). (3)
From (3), it follows that the firm’s net marginal benefit from investing in quality is
∂Π˜
∂q
= rd
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
∂x˜
∂q
(θ, q, d) f (θ) dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive margin effect
+ rd
∂θ˜
∂q
x˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin effect
− C ′(q). (4)
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The intensive margin effect captures how a change in quality level affects the firm’s
revenue via a change in the total amount of information provided by consumers holding
the size of its user base fixed. Using Lemma 1, we can show that this effect is positive.
More intuitively, this is because quality and information are complements: a higher
quality level induces the firm’s customers to provide more information. The extensive
margin effect captures how the change in demand (i.e., in the size of the user base)
resulting from a change in quality impacts the firm’s profit. This effect is weakly
positive as the firm’s demand is weakly increasing in quality as shown in Lemma 2.
The net marginal benefit from increasing the disclosure level is
∂Π˜
∂d
= r
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
[
x˜ (θ, q, d) + d
∂x˜
∂d
(θ, q, d)
]
f (θ) dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive margin effect
+ rd
∂θ˜
∂d
x˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin effect
The intensive and extensive margin effects of a change in disclosure level can be in-
terpreted in a similar manner as those of a change in quality level. Lemma 1 implies
that the sign of the intensive margin effect is ambiguous, while Lemma 2 shows that
the extensive margin effect is weakly negative. The sign of the intensive margin effect
is ambiguous because a change in the disclosure level generates two opposite effects: it
raises the firm’s disclosure revenues per unit of information provided but lowers each
consumer’s information provision level.
Let us assume that Π˜ (., .) is strictly quasi-concave in each of its arguments. The
privately optimal level of quality for a given level of disclosure and the privately optimal
level of disclosure for a given level of quality are defined as follows:25
qM (d) ≡ arg max
q∈[0,+∞)
Π˜ (q, d) ;
dM (q) ≡ arg max
d∈[0,1]
Π˜ (q, d) .
We further assume that the privately optimal pair of quality and disclosure levels(
q˜M , d˜M
)
≡ arg max
(q,d)∈[0,+∞)×[0,1]
Π˜ (q, d)
25The existence and uniqueness of qM (d) follows from the fact that Π˜ (q, d) is continuous and strictly
quasi-concave in q and Π˜ (q, d) −→
q−→+∞ −∞, while the existence and uniqueness of d
M (q) follows from
the fact that Π˜ (q, d) is continuous and strictly quasi-concave in d over the compact set [0, 1].
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is unique.26
Let us now consider the social incentives for quality provision and information dis-
closure. The social planner aims to maximize the sum of the firm’s profit and consumer
surplus:27
W˜ (q, d) ≡ Π˜ (q, d) +
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
U˜ (θ, q, d) f (θ) dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C˜S(q,d)
.
Assuming that W˜ (., .) is strictly quasi-concave in each of its arguments, the socially
optimal quality level for a given level of disclosure and the socially optimal disclosure
level for a given level of quality are defined as follows:28
qW (d) ≡ arg max
q∈[0,+∞)
W˜ (q, d) ;
dW (q) ≡ arg max
d∈[0,1]
W˜ (q, d) .
In the following lemma, we compare the socially and privately optimal levels of
quality for a given level of disclosure and those of disclosure for a given level of quality.29
Lemma 3 (Private vs social incentives)
- For a given disclosure level, the monopolist under-provides quality from a social welfare
perspective: qM (d) ≤ qW (d) for any d ∈ [0, 1].
- For a given quality level, the monopolist over-discloses information from a social
welfare perspective: dM (q) ≥ dW (q) for any q ∈ [0,+∞).
The under-provision (rep. over-disclosure) result stems from the fact that the firm
does not fully internalize the increase (resp. decrease) in consumers’ utility that results
from higher quality (resp. disclosure). Under the regularity conditions that we have
26The existence of the optimal pair of quality and disclosure levels follows from tha fact that Π˜ (q, d)
is continuous in (q, d) and Π˜ (q, d) goes to −∞ uniformly with respect to d when q → −∞ (which
allows to reduce the maximization over [0,+∞)× [0, 1] to a maximization over a compact set).
27Recall that third parties’ surplus is zero in the baseline model.
28The existence and uniqueness of qW (d) follows from the fact that W˜ (q, d) is continuous and strictly
quasi-concave in q and W˜ (q, d) −→
q−→+∞ −∞, while the existence and uniqueness of d
W (q) follows from
the fact that W˜ (q, d) is continuous and strictly quasi-concave in d over the compact set [0, 1].
29Note that the comparison of the privately optimal pair
(
q˜M , d˜M
)
with its socially optimal coun-
terpart is not relevant for our policy analysis because the regulator has a single instrument (i.e., a cap
on the disclosure level).
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imposed, Lemma 3 can help us determine the direction of the impact of a change in
quality (resp. disclosure) level, holding disclosure (resp. quality) level fixed, on the
firm’s profit or on social welfare. These results will come in handy for the analysis of
the privacy regulation examined in the next section.
5 Privacy regulation
We now turn to the core question of our paper: is it socially desirable to regulate the
information disclosure level? The first step to answering this question, as will become
apparent, is understanding the impact of such a regulation on the firm’s quality choice.
We consider a scenario where the only available regulatory instrument is a cap on
the disclosure level and study the decision of a social-welfare-maximizing regulator to
implement such a cap.
The timing of the game is as follows:
- First, the regulator decides whether to impose a cap on the disclosure level and
sets the value of that cap d¯ if it does so.
- Second, the firm decides on its disclosure and quality levels.
- Third, consumers decide whether to patronize the firm and how much information
to provide if they do so.
Let us first analyze the firm’s behavior in the second stage when the regulator
imposes a cap d¯ in the first stage. The firm’s optimal disclosure level maximizes
Π˜
(
qM (d) , d
)
subject to the constraint d ≤ d¯. If d¯ ≥ d˜M , the constraint is not binding.
In this case, the firm’s decision will be the same as in the unregulated scenario; i.e., the
firm will set its disclosure level at d = d˜M . If d¯ < d˜M , the constraint binds. Under the
additional assumption that Π˜
(
qM (d) , d
)
is strictly quasi-concave in d, which we make
in the remainder of the paper, the firm will choose d = d¯ whenever d¯ < d˜M .
Let us now consider the regulator’s decision in the first stage. Notice first that setting
no cap or setting a cap d¯ > d˜M is the same as setting a cap d¯ = d˜M . In all of these
scenarios, the cap does not affect the firm’s behavior, and therefore has no impact on
social welfare. We focus on the (interesting) scenario in which (i) the firm invests in
quality in the absence of a disclosure cap (i.e. q˜M > 0) and (ii) the regulator does not
find it optimal to impose a disclosure cap that induces no investment in quality at all
14
(i.e., a cap such that qM(d¯) = 0). Then, denoting30
d ≡ inf
{
d ∈
[
0, d˜M
)
| qM (d) > 0
}
,
we can restrict the analysis to disclosure caps d¯ between d and d˜M . More precisely, the
regulator’s maximization program can be written as
max
d¯∈[d,d˜M ]
Wˆ
(
d¯
) ≡ W˜ (qM(d¯), d¯) = Π˜ (qM(d¯), d¯)+ θ˜(q
M (d¯),d¯)∫
θ
U˜
(
θ, qM(d¯), d¯
)
f (θ) dθ.
Further, assume that Wˆ (.) is strictly quasi-concave over
[
d, d˜M
]
. Under this regularity
assumption, the regulator finds it strictly optimal to set a binding cap; i.e., there exists
d¯ < d˜M such that Wˆ
(
d¯
)
> Wˆ
(
d˜M
)
, if and only if
− ∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
> 0.
In other words, setting a binding disclosure cap is strictly socially desirable if and only
if a marginal decrease in disclosure level starting from the unregulated level leads to an
increase in social welfare. The following lemma provides a useful decomposition of the
welfare effect of a marginal decrease in disclosure level.
Lemma 4 The marginal impact of a decrease in disclosure level on social welfare at
the unregulated level is given by
− ∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
=
θ˜(q˜M ,d˜M)∫
θ
θx˜
(
θ, q˜M , d˜M
)
f (θ) dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
−
θ˜(q˜M ,d˜M)∫
θ
∂V
∂q
(
x˜
(
θ, q˜M , d˜M
)
, q˜M
) ∂qM
∂d
∣∣∣∣
d=d˜M
f (θ) dθ.
︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic effect
30Our focus on the case in which qM
(
d˜M
)
= q˜M is positive, combined with the fact that qM (d)
is continuous at d = d˜M (which follows from Berge’s Theorem of the Maximum) ensures that the
considered set is not empty and that its lower bound d is well-defined in
[
0, d˜M
)
.
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This lemma shows that a (marginal) decrease in disclosure level starting from the
unregulated level generates two effects: a direct effect on the privacy costs incurred by
consumers (holding the quality level constant), and a strategic effect, which captures
how a decrease in the disclosure level (due to the disclosure cap) alters the firm’s
quality choice. The direct effect is always positive because there is over-disclosure by
the firm from a social perspective, while the sign of the strategic effect depends on how
the firm’s quality choice responds to the reduction in disclosure level. Since the firm
under-provides quality from a social perspective, a marginal increase in quality level
at the unregulated equilibrium raises social welfare. Therefore, the strategic effect is
(weakly) positive if the firm (weakly) increases its quality level when disclosure level
is decreased; i.e., if −∂qM
∂d
∣∣∣
d=d˜M
≥ 0. When the strategic effect is positive, the overall
social welfare effect of a marginal decrease in disclosure level from its unregulated level
is unambiguously positive, which implies that it is strictly socially desirable to set a
binding disclosure cap. However, if −∂qM
∂d
∣∣∣
d=d˜M
< 0, the strategic effect is negative and
the overall social welfare effect of a disclosure cap on becomes a priori ambiguous.31
Let us now analyze the effect of a disclosure cap on quality, which determines the
sign of the strategic effect described above. The following lemma relates the effect of a
change in disclosure level on the firm’s optimal quality level to the cross-effect of quality
and disclosure on the firm’s profit.
Lemma 5 (Effect of a decrease in disclosure level on quality) If qM (d) > 0, then
−∂q
M
∂d
=
∂2Π˜
∂q∂d
(
qM(d), d
)
∂2Π˜
∂q2
(qM(d), d)
.
From Lemma 5, we see that the effect of a decrease in disclosure level on the firm’s
choice of quality has the opposite sign of the cross-effect of quality and disclosure on
the firm’s profit, i.e. ∂
2Π˜
∂q∂d
(
qM(d), d
)
.32 More intuitively, the Lemma tells us that if the
marginal benefit of investing in quality is increasing (resp. decreasing) in the level of
disclosure, the firm will invest less (resp. more) at lower levels of disclosure.
For our analysis, we distinguish between the scenarios where the market is fully
covered and where it is partially covered. A change in quality level only generates an
intensive margin effect when the market is fully covered, but it also creates an extensive
31This shows more fundamentally that although the disclosure cap unambiguously mitigates the
market failure of over-disclosure of personal information, it can either mitigate or amplify the market
failure of under-provision of quality.
32This follows from the second-order condition ∂
2Π˜
∂q2
(
qM (d), d
)
< 0.
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margin effect (arising from a change in demand) when the market is partially covered.
Consequently, the cross-effect of quality and disclosure on the firm’s profit will depend
on whether the market is fully covered.
5.1 Full market coverage
Suppose that θ˜
(
qM(d), d
)
= θ¯ for any d ∈ [0, 1].33 Under this assumption, the market
is fully covered regardless of the regulator’s decision in the first stage of the game.
Consider the firm’s optimal choice of quality for a given level of disclosure. The
firm’s marginal benefit from investing in quality is provided by (4), with the term
capturing the effect of disclosure on the extensive margin effect equal to zero under full
market coverage. The impact of a disclosure cap on quality is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 (Effect of a disclosure cap on quality under full market coverage) When
the market is fully covered, a disclosure cap d¯ ∈
(
d, d˜M
)
has a negative impact on
quality.
The intuition behind the above proposition is as follows. In a fully covered market,
the firm invests in quality because its existing customers provide more information
when its service is of better quality; this allows the firm to generate higher disclosure
revenues. A cap on disclosure level weakens the firm’s ability to monetize the additional
data that consumers provide when it offers a higher quality level, thereby lowering its
marginal benefit of quality investment. The firm’s investment in quality is therefore
lower if a binding disclosure cap is implemented. A direct implication of Proposition 1
is that there always exists a trade-off between privacy and quality when the market is
fully covered.
Let us now turn to the social desirability of a disclosure cap. Recall from the
preceding discussion that it is strictly optimal for the regulator to set a disclosure cap
if and only if a marginal decrease in disclosure level from its unregulated level d¯ = d˜M
increases social welfare. From Lemmas 4 and 5, it follows that
− ∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
=
θ¯∫
θ
θx˜(θ, q˜M , d˜M)f(θ)dθ − rγ
C ′′(q˜M)
θ¯∫
θ
∂V
∂q
(x˜(θ, q˜M , d˜M), q˜M)f(θ)dθ.
33A sufficient—but not necessary—condition for this to hold is that K < V (0, 0).
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Since q˜M , d˜M and x˜(θ, ., .) also depend on γ, it is a priori unclear how the expression
above depends on γ. However, it can be easily shown that it is positive for γ below a
certain threshold γ˜.34 Thus, a cap on the disclosure level is strictly socially desirable
whenever γ < γ˜; i.e., when the complementarity between quality and information is
not too strong. In other words, under this condition, there exists a cap d¯ between
d and d˜M that leads to a strict increase in social welfare relative to the unregulated
scenario. However, when quality and information are sufficiently strong complements
(i.e., γ > γ˜), the sign of − ∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
is ambiguous and therefore, so is the impact of
a disclosure cap on social welfare.35 In this case, one cannot exclude the possibility
that the decrease in social welfare due to the reduction in quality (the strategic effect)
may outweigh the increase in welfare resulting from the reduction in privacy costs (the
direct effect).
More intuitively, the full market coverage scenario we consider here is essentially one
in which the demand for the firm’s service is unresponsive to changes in quality and dis-
closure levels—no consumers join or leave the firm. The firm’s existing customers react
to these changes only by adjusting the amount of information they share. A disclosure
cap reduces the quality of the firm’s service, and consumers share less information as a
result. Moreover, the stronger the complementarity between quality and information,
the larger the reduction in information sharing. This reduction in the amount of in-
formation provided decreases both the gross utility obtained by the consumers and the
disclosure revenues of the firm, thereby lowering social welfare. When quality and infor-
mation are relatively weak complements (γ < γ˜), the negative welfare impact from the
fall in quality level is dominated by the positive impact from the reduction consumers’
privacy costs, and a disclosure cap is socially desirable. When quality and information
are relatively strong complements, the impact from the decrease in quality level may
dominate, and the effect of the disclosure cap on social welfare is ambiguous.
The following proposition summarizes the above analysis.
34To see why, define
γ˜ ≡
{
γ′ > 0| ∂Wˆ
∂d
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
< 0 for all γ ∈ (0, γ′)
}
.
From the fact that ∂Wˆ∂d
∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
is continuous in γ and (strictly) negative when γ → 0, it follows that the
above set is not empty, which ensures that its upper bound γ˜ is well-defined in R++ ∪ {+∞}. Note
that one cannot exclude a priori that γ˜ takes an infinite value.
35If γ˜ takes an infinite value, privacy regulation would be socially desirable whatever the level of
complementarity between quality and information.
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Proposition 2 (Social desirability of a disclosure cap under full market coverage)
When the market is fully covered, a privacy regulation taking the form of a binding
disclosure cap is strictly socially desirable if the complementarity between quality and
information is not too strong (i.e., γ < γ˜). Otherwise, the social desirability of such a
regulation is ambiguous.
5.2 Partial market coverage
We now consider the scenario in which θ˜
(
qM(d), d
)
< θ¯ for any d ∈ [0, 1]. In this case,
the market is only partially covered whatever the regulator’s decision in the first stage.
Let F (.) denote the cumulative distribution function of θ. It follows from expression
(4) and Lemmas 1 and 2 that the firm’s net marginal benefit from investing in quality
is
∂Π˜
∂q
= rdγF
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive margin effect
+ r
∂V
∂q
(
x˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
, q
)
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin effect
− C ′(q) (5)
whenever the market is partially covered; i.e., θ˜ (q, d) ∈ (θ, θ¯).
The effect of the disclosure level on the firm’s optimal choice of quality is driven by
the cross-effect of quality and disclosure on the firm’s profit. Differentiating expression
(5) with respect to d and using the results from Lemmas 1 and 2,36 we obtain the
effect of a marginal decrease in disclosure level on the marginal benefit from investing
in quality:
− ∂
2Π˜
∂q∂d
= −rγF
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
−rdγ ∂θ˜
∂d
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B
−r∂V
∂q
∂θ˜
∂d
f ′
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C
. (6)
Term A+ B shows how the intensive margin effect of investment in quality is affected
by a decrease in disclosure level. More specifically, term A corresponds to the effect
of a decrease in the disclosure level on the marginal benefit from investing in quality
for a given demand for the service (i.e., for a fixed size of user base); it captures how
the users of the firm’s service adjust the amount of information they share in response
to a decrease in disclosure level. This is the only term that appears in our analysis of
the full market coverage scenario (where θ˜ (q, d) = θ¯) and its sign is negative. Under
36We use in particular the fact that ∂x˜∂θ
∂θ˜
∂d +
∂x˜
∂d = 0. For notational convenience, we drop the
arguments of ∂V∂q
(
q, x˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
))
and ∂
2V
∂q∂x
(
q, x˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
))
.
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partial market coverage, a change in disclosure level also affects the intensive margin
effect by changing the level of demand (at every given quality level). This effect, which
is captured by term B, is positive because a decrease in disclosure level leads to an
expansion of the user base. Finally, term C shows how the extensive margin effect of
quality investment changes if the disclosure level decreases. Since the extensive margin
effect is proportional to the density of consumers at the margin and the impact of
disclosure on demand is negative, term C is positive (resp. negative) if the density
function is locally increasing (resp. decreasing). The following result shows that the
sign of the net effect A + B + C depends on the elasticity and the curvature of the
cumulative distribution function F (.).
Lemma 6 (Impact of a decrease in disclosure level on the intensive and extensive mar-
gin effects)
- If F (.) is relatively inelastic (resp. elastic), i.e., θf(θ)
F (θ)
< 1 (resp. > 1) for all
θ ∈ [θ, θ¯), the impact of a decrease in disclosure level on the intensive margin effect of
investment in quality is negative (resp. positive).
- If F (.) is convex (resp. concave) over
[
θ, θ¯
)
, the impact of a decrease in disclosure
level on the extensive margin effect of investment in quality is positive (resp. negative).
The elasticity of F (.) is related to the shape of the demand for the service. We
show in Appendix B that this corresponds to the elasticity of demand with respect to
disclosure level (holding the amount of information shared constant). We also establish
that the convexity/concavity of F (.) is related to the elasticity of the marginal effect of
quality on demand with respect to disclosure level, holding the amount of information
constant; it is greater (resp. less) than 1 if F (.) is convex (resp. concave). Therefore,
the curvature of F (.) tells us how the responsiveness of demand to a change in quality
level is affected by changes in the disclosure level.
We can now state our result on the impact of a disclosure cap on quality.
Proposition 3 (Effect of a disclosure cap on quality under partial market coverage)
Assume that the market is partially covered.
- If F (.) is weakly convex, the effect of a disclosure cap d¯ ∈
(
d, d˜M
)
on quality is
positive.
- If F (.) is concave and relatively inelastic, the effect of a disclosure cap d¯ ∈
(
d, d˜M
)
on quality is negative.
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- If F (.) is concave and relatively elastic, the effect of a disclosure cap d¯ ∈
(
d, d˜M
)
on quality is negative if the complementarity between quality and information is not too
strong, and is ambiguous otherwise.
Unlike in the full market coverage scenario—where a cap always reduces quality
level—the cap may either decrease or increase quality level under the partial cover-
age scenario. Proposition 3 characterizes how a disclosure cap affects quality level
depending on the shape of the distribution of privacy costs and the degree of comple-
mentary between quality and information. Under partial market coverage, a disclosure
cap generates two additional effects relative to the full market coverage scenario: an
expansion of the firm’s user base (or demand) and a change in the sensitivity of de-
mand to quality; both of these impact the marginal benefit of investing in quality. A
bigger user base implies a larger increase in the amount of user-provided data when the
firm (marginally) increases its quality level; this raises the marginal benefit of quality
investment. The change in the sensitivity of demand to quality may either increase
or decrease the marginal benefit of investment depending on whether this sensitivity
increases substantially under a disclosure cap. The overall effect of a disclosure cap
on the firm’s incentives to invest in quality is thus the combination of a negative ef-
fect (due to the decline in the firm’s ability to monetize user data via disclosure), a
positive effect (due to demand expansion) and an ambiguous effect (due to a change
in the sensitivity of demand to quality). A disclosure cap raises quality investment if
the second effect is large enough and/or the third effect is positive or large enough.
Proposition 3 shows that this holds when F (.) is weakly convex. In contrast, when F (.)
is concave, the impact of the cap on quality level is either negative or ambiguous, de-
pending on the elasticity of the demand with respect to disclosure level and the degree
of complementarity between quality and information.
The results above may be better understood with the aid of a simple illustration.
Consider the special case of the uniform distribution (i.e., θ ∼ U [θ, θ]). The uniform
distribution is weakly convex, and therefore case (i) of Proposition 3 applies: a dis-
closure cap leads to more quality investment. To see why, notice first that term C
in Equation (6) is equal to zero in the uniform distribution case; this implies that a
disclosure cap does not affect the extensive margin effect of quality investment, and we
do not have the ambiguous effect described above. The cap only generates the nega-
tive effect—a reduction in the firm’s disclosure revenue for any given user base—and
the positive effect—an expansion in the firm’s user base. In the uniform distribution
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case, the positive effect of the cap dominates: the increase in disclosure revenues from
the expansion in the firm’s user base more than compensates for the fall in disclosure
revenues for a given user base. Overall, the firm has stronger incentives to invest in
quality.
Combining Proposition 3 with the fact that the direct effect of a disclosure cap on
social welfare is always (strictly) positive leads us to the following result about the
social desirability of a cap on the disclosure level.
Proposition 4 (Social desirability of a disclosure cap under partial market coverage)
Assume that the market is partially covered.
- If F (.) is weakly convex, a privacy regulation taking the form of a binding disclosure
cap is strictly socially desirable.
- If F (.) is concave, a privacy regulation taking the form of a binding disclosure cap
has an ambiguous effect on social welfare.
Thus, when the market is partially covered, a disclosure cap may be socially de-
sirable even when quality and information are strong complements from consumers’
perspective. In particular, this is the case if the reduction in disclosure level substan-
tially increases the responsiveness of demand to an increase in quality level (i.e., if F (.)
is weakly convex). In this scenario, the regulator can improve both consumer privacy
and service quality by setting a disclosure cap.37
6 Extensions
6.1 Heterogeneous third parties
In this extension, we analyze the scenario where third parties are heterogeneous in the
privacy cost that they induce for consumers.38 This heterogeneity could reflect, for
instance, differences in data use practices of these third parties. Consider the case of
37Note that we do not consider in this paper the scenario in which the market can be fully or partially
covered depending on the regulator’s decision in the first stage. In such a scenario, the regulator’s
problem is less smooth than in the two cases we considered. Because of that, solving this problem
would require us to determine the optimal disclosure cap under each of the two regimes (i.e., full
market coverage and partial market coverage) and compare the corresponding social welfare values.
While this substantially complicates the analysis, it is unclear whether it would provide additional
insights into the desirability of privacy regulation.
38See Bergemann and Bonatti (2015) and Bergemann et al. (2018) for models in which a monopolist
sells personal information to third parties that are heterogeneous along other dimensions.
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third-party advertisers. Some advertisers may choose to target their advertisements
using data at a more aggregated level than others (e.g., based on demographic groups
instead of individual characteristics), thereby resulting in lower privacy costs.
Let us assume that disclosing a unit of personal information to a third party of type
s ∈ [0, 1] induces a privacy cost 2θs for the consumer of type θ (instead of a privacy cost
θ in the baseline model). The total privacy cost incurred by a consumer of type θ when
an amount x of her personal information is disclosed to third parties located in [0, d] is
then given by
d∫
0
2θsxds = θd2x. Correspondingly, the consumer’s utility function is
U(x, θ, q, d) = V (x, q)− (α + θd2)x−K.
Under the full market coverage scenario, the impact of a disclosure cap on quality
and social welfare are qualitatively the same as in our baseline model: a disclosure cap
lowers the investment in quality but is socially desirable if the complementarity between
quality and information is not too strong.
However, under the partial market coverage scenario, the results are qualitatively
affected by the assumption that third parties are heterogeneous. More specifically,
straightforward computations show that the effect of a decrease in disclosure level on
the marginal benefit from investing in quality has the following form:
− ∂
2Π˜
∂q∂d
=
1
d
(A+B + C) +
(
1− 1
d
)
A︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ D︸︷︷︸
≥0
,
whereas it is equal to A+B +C in our baseline model. This implies that the effect of
a disclosure cap on quality is positive in this extension whenever it was positive in the
baseline model. Therefore, we get the following result:
Proposition 5 (Effect of a disclosure cap with heterogeneous third parties)
- Under full market coverage, a disclosure cap d¯ ∈
(
d, d˜M
)
has a negative effect on
quality. However, setting a binding disclosure cap is socially desirable if quality and
information are not strong complements.
- Under partial market coverage, the effect of a disclosure cap d¯ ∈
(
d, d˜M
)
on quality
is weakly positive if F (.) is weakly convex. Consequently, setting a binding disclosure
cap is socially desirable if F (.) is weakly convex.
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6.2 Consumer-surplus-maximizing regulator
In the analysis of privacy regulation presented previously, we considered the decision
problem of a regulator who seeks to maximize social welfare, which is given by the sum of
the firm’s profit and consumer surplus.39 We now examine the case where the regulator
is a consumer protection agency, whose objective is to maximize consumer surplus. Let
us focus again on the scenario in which the regulator does not find it optimal to choose a
disclosure cap that induces no investment in quality.40 The regulator seeks to maximize
ĈS(d¯) ≡ C˜S(qM(d¯), d¯) =
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
U˜(θ, qM(d¯), d¯)f (θ) dθ
over
[
d, d˜M
]
. Assuming that ĈS(.) is strictly quasi-concave over this interval, setting
a binding cap on disclosure is strictly desirable from the perspective of the consumer
agency if the marginal benefit of lower disclosure to the consumers is positive when
evaluated at d¯ = d˜M ; i.e., − ∂ĈS
∂d¯
∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
> 0.
We now compare the desirability of a disclosure cap for a consumer protection agency
and for a social-welfare-maximizing planner.
Proposition 6 (Consumer-surplus-maximizing vs socially optimal disclosure cap)
- A privacy regulation taking the form of a disclosure cap is strictly desirable for a
consumer protection agency if and only if it is strictly socially desirable.
- When such a regulation is strictly desirable for the cpnsumer protection agency,
its optimal disclosure cap is lower than the socially optimal disclosure cap.
The circumstances under which a disclosure cap is desirable from consumers’ per-
spective are the same as those under which it is socially desirable. The reason behind
this finding is that a marginal decrease of the disclosure level starting from the pri-
vately optimal disclosure level d˜M has a second-order effect on the firm’s profit but a
first-order effect on consumer surplus.
39Recall that third parties do not get any surplus in our baseline setting.
40If the consumer protection agency finds it optimal to choose a disclosure cap that leads to no
investment in quality, it will choose d¯ = 0 (as this will minimize the privacy costs incurred by con-
sumers).
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7 Discussion
7.1 Alternative interpretation of the model
In our analysis, we interpreted the consumer’s input, x, as the amount of information
that a consumer provides to the firm. This interpretation is appropriate when consid-
ering a matching website, where each user decides on the preferences she reveals, or in
the context of services involving user-generated content, where each user decides on the
amount of content to share (e.g., on a social media platform). This interpretation may,
however, be less suited to other forms of Internet services, such as email and search.
In these contexts, consumers do not directly supply information to the firm; instead,
information is generated as a result of their use of the firm’s service. The relevant con-
sumer choice variable (and hence the appropriate interpretation of x) is therefore usage
intensity, rather than information provision level. Correspondingly, α, which formerly
captured the marginal cost of providing information, can be interpreted more generally
as the marginal opportunity cost of using the firm’s service.
7.2 Positive surplus for third parties
We assumed in our baseline model that the firm was able to appropriate all the surplus
generated by the access of a third party to its customers’ personal information. Let
us relax this assumption by allowing third parties to capture a positive share of that
surplus. More precisely, we assume that the unit price of personal information is βr,
where β ∈ (0, 1].
The firm’s profit function in this variant of our model can be derived from the one in
our baseline setting by replacing r with βr. This implies in particular that the effect of
a disclosure cap on firm’s choice of quality is (qualitatively) the same as in the baseline
model. More precisely, Propositions 1 and 3 still hold.
That said, when it comes to the effect of a disclosure cap on social welfare —defined
as the sum of the firm’s profit, the third parties’ surplus and consumer surplus—it
becomes more complicated to derive unambiguous results in the current setting. To
see why, consider first the direct effect of a marginal decrease in the disclosure level
(starting from the firm’s optimal disclosure level) on social welfare. In our baseline
model (i.e., β = 1) this effect is always positive. However, when the surplus of third
parties with whom personal information is shared is positive (i.e., β < 1), this need
not be true. A decrease in the disclosure level still leads to an increase in consumer
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surplus (through a decrease in privacy costs), but it also results in a decrease in the
surplus of third parties. Moreover, when the surplus of third parties is positive, there
is an additional indirect effect, besides the strategic effect we identified in our baseline
model. This additional effect corresponds to the positive impact of a disclosure cap
on the amount of information provided by consumers and, therefore, on the surplus of
the third parties with whom personal data is shared. When this indirect effect and the
strategic effect we identified in our baseline model do not have the same sign (which is
the case when a disclosure cap has a negative effect on quality), the sign of the overall
indirect effect of a disclosure cap depends on their relative magnitudes.
Importantly, notice that if the regulator maximizes consumer surplus instead of
social welfare, allowing third parties to make a positive surplus out of their access to
customers’ personal data does not affect the desirability of a disclosure cap (as long as
r is replaced with βr in the analysis).
7.3 Inability to commit to a disclosure level
We assumed in our baseline model that the firm is able to commit to its disclosure level.
We now suppose that the firm is unable to commit, which implies that consumers need to
anticipate its disclosure level when making their participation and information provision
decisions. Since the firm finds it optimal to choose the highest possible disclosure level
for any given consumer beliefs, an equilibrium with rational expectations necessarily
features d = 1 absent any regulation.41 In such an environment, regulation serves two
purposes. First, it allows the firm to commit to a maximum disclosure level.42 Second,
it constrains the firm’s behavior by limiting its choice set.43
Our analysis and results on the impact of a disclosure cap on quality investment in
the baseline setting carries over to the no-commitment scenario.44 The only difference
in the no-commitment setting is that Propositions 1 and 3 hold for any disclosure cap
d¯ ∈ (d, 1) instead of d¯ ∈
(
d, d˜M
)
.
41This is due partly to the static nature of the game. See Jullien et al. (2018) for a model where a
firm cannot commit to its privacy policy in a setting where it interacts repeatedly with its customers.
42This can be made possible through heavy sanctions against firms that violate the regulation. For
instance, the fine for violating the European General Data Protection Regulation is up to e20 million
or 4% of the company’s global annual turnover of the previous financial year, whichever is higher.
43While the second effect has a negative impact on the firm, the first effect positively affects the firm.
In other words, if the regulation were to serve as a commitment device only, the firm would always
welcome it.
44The reason is that the sign of the cross-effect of quality and disclosure levels on profit is what
matters, regardless of whether the firm is able to commit to a disclosure level or not.
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The analysis of the social desirability of privacy regulation is, however, more complex
than in the baseline model. That said, under the regularity assumption that Wˆ (.) is
strictly quasi-concave in d¯, we can show that regulation is socially desirable under
the no-commitment scenario whenever it is socially desirable under the commitment
scenario.45 This implies that the scope for a welfare-enhancing privacy regulation is
larger under the former scenario than the latter.
7.4 Network externalities
Assume now that the utility of each customer increases with the amount of information
provided by the other customers. This form of network externalities exists for instance in
social media platforms. To incorporate these externalities, we augment the consumer’s
utility in the baseline model by σX, where X ≡ ∫ θ¯
θ
x (θ) dθ is the amount of personal
information provided by all (other) consumers46 and σ ≥ 0 is a parameter that captures
the intensity of the externalities.
Observe first that, conditional on using the service, consumers’ optimal level of
information provision does not depend on the network externalities σX and is, therefore,
the same as in the baseline model; i.e., x˜ (θ, q, d). This implies in particular that the
presence of network externalities does not affect our results in the full market coverage
scenario: a disclosure cap leads to a decrease in quality investment but is still socially
desirable if quality and information are strongly complementary for consumers.
Although network externalities do not affect consumers’ information provision de-
cision, they alter their participation decision. This changes the firm’s marginal benefit
from investing in quality under the partial market coverage scenario, and therefore
quantitatively affects our analysis. Specifically, it can be shown that in a fulfilled ex-
pectations equilibrium (i.e., a situation where each consumer anticipates correctly the
decisions of all other consumers), there exists as in the baseline model a threshold
θ˜ (q, d, σ) such that only consumers with type θ < θ˜ (q, d, σ) use the service.47 The
effect of a marginal decrease in disclosure level on the marginal benefit of investing in
45To see why, notice that the quasi-concavity of Wˆ (.) with respect to d¯ implies that −∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣
d¯=1
> 0
whenever −∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
> 0.
46Since a consumer is of zero measure in our setting, the total amount of personal information
provided by all consumers and the total amount of information provided by all consumers but one
coincide.
47This threshold and, therefore, the demand for the service are increasing in the intensity of network
externalities σ (and are therefore larger than in the baseline model, i.e. σ = 0).This intuitive result
follows from the fact that consumers’ utility function is increasing in σ and X.
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quality—which determines the impact of a disclosure cap on quality—can again be split
in three terms: the impact of an decrease in disclosure level on i) the intensive margin
effect for a fixed demand, ii) the intensive margin effect via the change in demand it
induces, and iii) the extensive margin effect. As in the baseline model, the first term is
negative, the second term is positive, and the sign of the third term is ambiguous. This
implies that a disclosure cap has again three effects on the firm’s incentives to invest in
quality: a negative effect through the decrease in the returns of investment for a fixed
demand, a positive effect stemming from the boost in demand induced by the cap, and
an ambiguous effect capturing the impact of the cap on the responsiveness of demand
to quality. Although the magnitude of these effects is not the same as in the baseline
model, the result still holds qualitatively: that the cap raises quality if it leads to a
large enough increase in the responsiveness of demand to quality.
7.5 Positive effect of disclosure on consumers
Our baseline model abstracts away from any positive effect of disclosure to third parties
on consumers. Assume now that disclosure brings about benefits to consumers which
we capture through an additional term βdx in the consumer utility function where
β ≥ 0.48 Thus, the net cost of disclosure for consumer of type θ is (θ − β) dx.
Note first that if β ≤ θ, i.e. all consumers are harmed by the disclosure of their
personal information in net terms, then it is straightfoward that it is sufficient to replace
θ by θ− β for our analysis to carry over. Suppose now that β > θ so that at least some
consumers benefit from the disclosure of their data to third parties. In this case, our
analysis still applies if aggregate consumer surplus is locally decreasing in the disclosure
level at
(
q˜M , d˜M
)
, which means that there is overdisclosure of personal information
when the firm is not regulated.49 If this condition is not satisfied then there is no case
for a regulation taking the form of a disclosure cap.
7.6 Positive prices for consumers
Our baseline model has focused on the case in which the firm offers the service for free to
consumers. While this is a widespread scenario in practice, it may also be the case that
the firm finds it optimal to charge consumers a positive price (in addition to disclosing
48We assume for the sake of exposition that β is the same for all consumers.
49This condition is met if the share of consumers that are harmed (in net terms) by the disclosure
of their personal information is sufficiently large.
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their personal data).50 Incorporating this possibility in our model would complicate the
analysis substantially. To see why, notice that in a simpler setting without investment
in quality and without an intensive margin (i.e., a setting where consumers would not
be able to choose the amount of data they provide), we would expect such a cap to lead
to an increase in the price charged to consumers. This is due to the so-called seesaw
effect in two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2006): a cap on data disclosure would
reduce the marginal benefit from attracting an additional consumer, which would make
it optimal for the website to increase the price on the consumer side. However, in
our setting, a cap on data disclosure would lead to a joint adjustment of both price
and quality. A quick inspection of the relevant cross-derivatives of the website’s profit
function suggests that the effects of a disclosure cap on both price and quality are quite
complex, and are likely to be ambiguous.
7.7 Substitutability between quality and information
For many Internet services, it is natural to think of the firm’s quality level and the
consumer information provision level as complements (i.e., γ > 0): the better the
quality of a firm’s service, the higher the level of usage or information provision by
consumers. There may also be cases, however, where the firm’s quality level and the
consumer’s information exhibit substitutability (i.e., γ < 0). User authentication is one
such scenario. Interpreting the firm’s quality level as its ability to verify its user identity
without the use of personal information provided by the consumer,51 the higher the
firm’s quality level, the lower the consumer’s utility from providing additional pieces of
personal information (phone number, secondary email address, etc.) for authentication
purposes.
Note that when quality and information are substitutes, a cap on the level of dis-
closure is always socially desirable under the full market coverage scenario. There is
no trade-off between privacy protection and quality provision in this case because the
firm never invests in quality. When the market is partially covered, however, a trade-off
between privacy and quality may also exist in the substitutes case.
50Note that the parameter K in our baseline model could be interpreted as an exogenous price.
51For example, the firm could make use of the IP address or geographical location to assess if a login
attempt is potentially fraudulent.
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7.8 Regulating quality instead of disclosure
Regulating the disclosure level is one way of addressing (partially) the market failure
identified in Section 4. An alternative way of doing so is to regulate the quality level.
In Appendix C, we study the effect of setting an ex ante minimum quality requirement
and analyze the social desirability of such a regulation. We show that the sign of the
effect of a minimum quality requirement on the disclosure level is the opposite of the
sign of the effect of a disclosure cap on quality: whenever a disclosure cap leads to a
lower (resp. higher) quality, a minimum quality requirement leads to a higher (resp.
lower) disclosure level. The reason is that both effects are driven by the (same) cross-
effect of quality and disclosure on profit. This “duality” between quality and disclosure
extends to the welfare effects of a regulation targeting one of them. More precisely,
because the direct effect of a marginal increase in quality above the unregulated level
on social welfare is positive (and, therefore, has the same sign as the direct effect of
a disclosure cap on social welfare), the conditions under which setting a minimum
quality requirement is socially desirable turn out to be qualitatively similar to those
under which setting a disclosure cap is desirable.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how a privacy regulation—specifically, a cap on data disclosure—
affects a monopolist’s incentives to invest in the quality of its service and social welfare.
We find that the impact of a reduction in disclosure level on the monopolist’s optimal
choice of quality is negative when the market is fully covered, and depends on the
effect of disclosure on the sensitivity of demand to quality when the market is partially
covered. Under full market coverage, a cap on the disclosure level is socially desirable
when the degree of complementarity between quality and information is not too strong.
Under partial market coverage, a cap is desirable when the marginal effect of quality
on demand is (sufficiently) elastic with respect to disclosure. As extensions, we also
analyzed the case where third parties are heterogeneous and the scenario in which the
regulator’s objective is consumer surplus maximization.
Our analysis has implications for the regulation of dominant firms’ disclosure policy.
It shows in particular that regulators should distinguish between firms whose demand
is (essentially) unresponsive to changes in quality and/or disclosure and those whose
demand is (significantly) responsive to such changes. For firms of the former type,
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regulators are likely to face a privacy-quality trade-off and will have to weigh the direct
privacy gains for consumers against lower investment in quality. The level of comple-
mentarity between quality and information from consumers’ perspective turns out to
be the key determinant of the desirability of privacy regulation in this scenario. For
firms of the latter type, our results provide conditions under which a disclosure cap
raises investment in quality, and therefore unambiguously increases social welfare.
In addition to a disclosure cap, another privacy regulation that can be explored
using our framework is the taxation of disclosure revenues. The taxation of digital
monopoly platforms have been studied, for instance, by Bloch and Demange (2018)
and Bourreau et al. (2018). However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has
considered the impact of taxation on the firm’s incentives to invest in quality. A (unit)
tax on the monopolist’s disclosure revenues would translate to a reduction in the value
of information in our model. Since this reduction affects both the optimal quality and
disclosure levels of the firm, the impact of a tax is a priori unclear.
Finally, our model may also be interpreted more generally than one of privacy and
quality. For example, the value of information can be thought of (more broadly) as the
value that the firm derives from the exploitation of consumer data.52 Correspondingly,
the level of disclosure could instead be interpreted as the degree of data exploitation
and the privacy cost parameter as a more general parameter reflecting the cost of
sharing information with the firm. One can even take a step further and consider
other types of inputs (besides personal information) that consumers may provide. For
instance, consumers could provide time or attention rather than personal information.
The interpretation of the consumers’ cost parameter (which captured the intensity of
privacy preferences in the case of information provision) would then change depending
on the input that we are considering.
52Bloch and Demange (2018) provide several interpretations for the degree of data exploitation.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Differentiating
∂U
∂x
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , θ, q, d) =
∂V
∂x
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q)− (α + θd) = 0 (7)
with respect to d yields
∂2V
∂x2
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q)
∂x˜
∂d
(θ, q, d)− θ = 0
and therefore
∂x˜
∂d
(θ, q, d) =
θ
∂2V
∂x2
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q)
< 0.
Differentiating (7) with respect to θ and q leads to
∂x˜
∂θ
(θ, q, d) =
d
∂2V
∂x2
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q)
< 0,
∂x˜
∂q
(θ, q, d) = −
∂2V
∂x∂q
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q)
∂2V
∂x2
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q)
= γ.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since U (x, θ, q, d) is decreasing in θ then U˜ (θ, q, d) = max
x∈[0,1]
U (x, θ, q, d)
is decreasing in θ (by the Envelope Theorem). Therefore, there exists θ˜ (q, d) ∈ [θ, θ¯]
such that, for any θ ∈ [θ, θ¯), the following equivalence holds:
U˜ (θ, q, d) > 0⇐⇒ θ < θ˜ (q, d) .
Moreover, whenever θ˜ (q, d) is in the open interval
(
θ, θ¯
)
, it is defined by
U˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
= 0.
Differentiating the latter with respect to q and d, and using the Envelope Theorem, we
get that
∂θ˜
∂q
= −
∂U˜
∂q
∂U˜
∂θ
= −
∂U
∂q
∂U
∂θ
=
∂V
∂q
dx˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
) > 0,
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∂θ˜
∂d
= −
∂U˜
∂d
∂U˜
∂θ
= −
∂U
∂d
∂U
∂θ
= − θ˜ (q, d)
d
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. The net marginal social benefit from investing in quality is
∂W˜
∂q
=
∂Π˜
∂q
+
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
∂U˜
∂q
(θ, q, d) f (θ) dθ +
∂θ˜
∂q
U˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
(8)
=
∂Π˜
∂q
+
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
∂V
∂q
(x˜ (θ, q, d) , q) f (θ) dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
∂θ˜
∂q
U˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by definition of θ˜(q,d)
.
The second term is obtained by applying the Envelope Theorem and the last term is
equal to zero both when θ˜ (q, d) < θ¯ and when θ˜ (q, d) = θ¯ (When θ˜ (q, d) < θ¯, this
follows from the fact that U˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
= 0, and when θ˜ (q, d) = θ¯ it follows from
the fact that ∂θ˜
∂q
= 0).
Likewise, the net marginal social benefit from information disclosure is
∂W˜
∂d
=
∂Π˜
∂d
+
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
∂U˜
∂d
(θ, q, d) f (θ) dθ +
∂θ˜
∂d
U˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
=
∂Π˜
∂d
−
θ˜(q,d)∫
θ
θx˜ (θ, q, d) f (θ) dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂θ˜
∂d
U˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
.
The first part of the lemma follows directly from the fact that
∂Π˜
∂q
<
∂W˜
∂q
and the strict quasi-concavity of Π˜ and W˜ with respect to q. Likewise, the second part
of the lemma follows directly from the fact that
∂Π˜
∂d
>
∂W˜
∂d
and the strict quasi-concavity of Π˜ and W˜ with respect to d.
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Proof of Lemma 4. The marginal effect of reducing the disclosure cap on social
welfare is
−∂Wˆ
∂d¯
= −∂Π˜
∂d
(
qM(d¯), d¯
)− θ˜(q
M (d¯),d¯)∫
θ
[
∂U˜
∂q
(
θ, qM(d¯), d¯
) ∂qM
∂d
+
∂U˜
∂d
(
θ, qM(d¯), d¯
)]
f (θ) dθ
−
[
∂θ˜
∂q
∂qM
∂d
+
∂θ˜
∂d
]
U˜
(
θ˜
(
qM(d¯), d¯
)
, qM(d¯), d¯
)
f
(
θ˜(qM(d¯), d¯)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= −∂Π˜
∂d
(
qM(d¯), d¯
)− θ˜(q
M (d¯),d¯)∫
θ
[
∂V
∂q
(
x˜
(
θ, qM(d¯), d¯
)
, qM(d¯)
) ∂qM
∂d
− θx˜ (θ, qM(d¯), d¯)] f (θ) dθ,
where the second equality is obtained by applying the Envelope Theorem. Evaluating
this at d¯ = d˜M and using the fact that
∂Π˜
∂d
(
qM(d˜M), d˜M
)
=
∂Π˜
∂d
(
q˜M , d˜M
)
= 0,
we obtain the result.
Proof of Lemma 5. Assume that qM (d) > 0. Then, by continuity, qM(d′) > 0 for
d′ sufficiently close to d. Therefore, for d′ sufficiently close to d, qM(d′) is an interior
solution given by the first-order condition
∂Π˜
∂q
(
qM(d′), d′
)
= 0.
Differentiating this with respect to d′ and evaluating it at d′ = d yields
∂2Π˜
∂q2
(
qM(d), d
) ∂qM
∂d
+
∂2Π˜
∂q∂d
(
qM(d), d
)
= 0,
which leads to the result.
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting ∂x˜
∂q
by its expression in Lemma 1 and using
the fact that C ′(0) = 0 we obtain that the marginal benefit of investing in quality is
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positive when evaluated at q = 0 for any d > 0:
∂Π˜
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣
q=0
= rdγ.
This implies that the firm’s optimal choice of quality level for a given level of disclosure,
qM(d), is positive for all levels of disclosure d > 0 (and is zero for d = 0).53 From Lemma
5 it follows that
∂qM
∂d
=
rγ
C ′′(qM(d))
> 0.
This leads us to the result.
Proof of Lemma 6. Using Lemmas 1 and 2 again, we can rewrite (6) as
− ∂
2Π˜
∂q∂d
= −rγF
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)1− θ˜ (q, d) f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
F
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A+B
+ r
∂V
∂q
θ˜ (q, d)
d
f ′
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
.
The result follows immediately from this decomposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 6 suggests that we should distinguish between four
scenarios. However, there are only three possible scenarios because the elasticity of F (.)
is always greater than 1 if F (.) is (globally) convex. To see why, notice that
θf (θ)
F (θ)
= 1 +
θf(θ)−
θ∫
θ
[f(u)− f (θ)] du
F (θ)
,
which is greater than 1 if f(.) is increasing. Before stating the main result of this section,
let us consider the limiting case where quality and information are independent; i.e.,
γ = 0. In this scenario, the intensive margin effect is zero regardless of the disclosure
level, while the extensive margin effect is increasing (resp. decreasing) in the disclosure
level if F (.) is concave (resp. convex). Consequently, a decrease in disclosure level leads
to a decrease (resp. increase) in the firm’s marginal benefit from investing in quality if
F (.) is concave (resp. convex).
Using Lemmas 5 and 6 and the observations above for the case γ = 0 (which extend
53This implies that d = 0 under full market coverage.
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by continuity to sufficiently small values of γ), we obtain the result.
Proof of Proposition 6. Since
∂ĈS
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
=
∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
− ∂Π˜
∂d
(
qM(d˜M), d˜M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=
∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d˜M
,
the condition under which a disclosure cap is desirable from the perspective of the
consumer protection agency is the same as that under which it is desirable from the
perspective of a social-welfare-maximizing regulator.
Let us now assume that setting a disclosure cap is strictly socially desirable and
compare the optimal cap d¯W for a social-welfare-maximizing regulator and the optimal
cap d¯C for a consumer-surplus-maximizing regulator. Since the disclosure cap is binding
and Π˜
(
qM (d) , d
)
is strictly quasi-concave with respect to d,
∂Π˜
∂d
(
qM(d¯W ), d¯W
)
> 0.
Therefore,
∂ĈS
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d¯W
<
∂Wˆ
∂d¯
∣∣∣∣∣
d¯=d¯W
≤ 0,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that d¯W > 0.54 From the strict
quasi-concavity of ĈS(.), it then follows that
d¯C < d¯W .
B Appendix: Elasticities
Denote
V˘ (x, q) ≡ V (x, q)− αx.
54Under the assumption that a social-welfare-maximizing regulator does not find it optimal to set a
disclosure cap that leads to no investment in quality, it must hold that d¯W > 0.
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The demand addressed to the firm when the amount of information is chosen optimally
by consumers is
D˜ (q, d) = F
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
= F
min
 V˘
(
x˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
, q
)
−K
dx˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
) , θ¯
 .
Consider the following function:
D(x, q, d) = F
(
min
(
V˘ (x, q)−K
dx
, θ¯
))
,
which can be interpreted as the demand addressed to the firm if all consumers using
the service (are required to) provide the same amount of information x. Notice that
D˜ (q, d) = D(x˜
(
θ˜ (q, d) , q, d
)
, q, d).
The elasticity of D(x, q, d) with respect to d is (in absolute value)
−d
∂D
∂d
D
=
d 1
d2
V˘ (x,q)−K
x
f
(
V˘ (x,q)−K
dx
)
F
(
V˘ (x,q)−K
dx
) = V˘ (x,q)−Kdx f
(
V˘ (x,q)−K
dx
)
F
(
V˘ (x,q)−K
dx
)
whenever D(x, q, d) ∈ (0, 1). In particular, under partial (positive) market coverage,
−d
∂D
∂d
D
∣∣∣∣∣
x=x˜(θ˜(q,d),q,d)
=
θ˜ (q, d) f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
F
(
θ˜ (q, d)
) ,
which shows that the elasticity of demand holding the amount of information constant
(at the level of the marginal consumer) is the same as the elasticity of the cumulative
distribution function (computed for the marginal type).
Similarly, assuming that ∂
2D
∂q∂d
≤ 0, straightforward algebraic manipulations show that
the elasticity of ∂D
∂q
with respect to d is given by:
−d
∂2D
∂q∂d
∂D
∂q
= 1 +
V˘ (x,q)−K
dx
f ′
(
V˘ (x,q)−K
dx
)
f
(
V˘ (x,q)−K
dx
)
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whenever D(x, q, d) ∈ (0, 1). In particular, under partial (positive) market coverage,
−d
∂2D
∂q∂d
∂D
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣
x=x˜(θ˜(q,d),q,d)
= 1 +
θ˜ (q, d) f ′
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
f
(
θ˜ (q, d)
) = 1 + θ˜ (q, d)F ′′
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
F ′
(
θ˜ (q, d)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
curvature of F (.)
.
This implies that the elasticity of ∂D
∂q
with respect to d holding the amount of informa-
tion constant is related to the curvature of F (.). It is greater (resp. less) than 1 if f ′(.)
is positive (resp. negative), that is, if F (.) is convex (resp. concave).
C Appendix: Minimum quality requirement
In this section, we investigate the social desirability of a policy whereby the authority
does not regulate the disclosure level but, instead, regulates the quality level ex ante
(i.e., before the disclosure level is set by the firm). Specifically, we study the decision
of a social-welfare-maximizing regulator whose only instrument is a minimum quality
standard. This requires, in particular, an understanding of the effect of a minimum
quality requirement on the disclosure level chosen by the firm.
More precisely, consider the following game:
- First, the regulator decides whether to impose a minimum quality requirement,
and sets the value of that requirement q if it does so.
- Second, the firm decides on its disclosure and quality levels.
- Third, consumers decide whether to patronize the firm and how much information
to provide if they do.
Let us first analyze the firm’s behavior for a given regulator’s choice. The firm’s
optimal quality level maximizes Π˜
(
q, dM (q)
)
, which we assume to be quasi-concave in
q, subject to the constraint q ≥ q. If q ≤ q˜M , the constraint is not binding; this means
that the firm’s decision will be the same as in the unregulated scenario. If q > q˜M ,
however, the constraint is binding. From the quasi-concavity of Π˜
(
q, dM (q)
)
with
respect to q, it then follows that the firm will choose q = q.
Consider now the regulator’s decision in the first stage. Note first that the regulator
must take account of the firm’s particpation constraint, i.e.,
Π˜
(
q, dM
(
q
)) ≥ 0.
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It can be easily shown that there exists q¯ > q˜M such that the participation constraint
above holds if and only if q ≤ q¯.55 Therefore, the regulator seeks to maximize
Wˇ
(
q
) ≡ W˜ (q, dM (q)) = Π˜ (q, dM (q))+ θ˜(q,d
M(q))∫
θ
U˜
(
θ, q, dM
(
q
))
f (θ) dθ
with respect to q ∈ [q˜M , q¯]. Assuming that Wˇ (.) is quasi-concave over this interval,
the regulator finds it strictly optimal to set a binding minimum quality requirement if
and only if
∂Wˇ
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
> 0.
Moreover, we have
∂Wˇ
∂q
=
∂Π˜
∂q
(
q, dM
(
q
))
+
θ˜(q,dM(q))∫
θ
[
∂U˜
∂d
(
θ, q, dM
(
q
)) ∂dM
∂q
+
∂U˜
∂q
(
θ, q, dM
(
q
))]
f (θ) dθ
+
[
∂θ˜
∂q
+
∂θ˜
∂d
∂dM
∂q
]
U˜
(
θ˜
(
q, dM
(
q
))
, q, dM
(
q
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
f
(
θ˜(q, dM
(
q
)
)
)
=
∂Π˜
∂q
(
q, dM
(
q
))
+
θ˜(q,dM(q))∫
θ
[
−θx˜ (θ, q, dM (q))+ ∂V
∂q
(
x˜
(
θ, q, dM
(
q
))
, q
)]
f (θ) dθ,
where the second equality follows from the application of the Envelope Theorem. Eval-
uating this at q = q˜M and using the fact that d˜M = dM(q˜M) yields
∂Wˇ
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
=
∂Π˜
∂d
(
q˜M , d˜M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
θ˜(q˜M ,d˜M)∫
θ
[
−θx˜
(
θ, q˜M , d˜M
) ∂dM
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
+
∂V
∂q
(
x˜
(
θ, q˜M , d˜M
)
, q˜M
)]
f (θ) dθ
55This follows from the fact that Π˜
(
q, dM (q)
)
is continuous and decreasing in q over
[
q˜M ,+∞)
(because it is quasi-concave in q and reaches its maximum at q = q˜M ).
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or, equivalently,
∂Wˇ
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
=
θ˜(q˜M ,d˜M)∫
θ
∂V
∂q
(
x˜
(
θ, q˜M , d˜M
)
, q˜M
)
f (θ) dθ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
−
θ˜(q˜M ,d˜M)∫
θ
θx˜
(
θ, q˜M , d˜M
) ∂dM
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
f (θ) dθ.
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
This shows that a (marginal) increase in the quality level starting from the unregulated
level has two effects: a direct effect on the value of the service for consumers (keeping the
disclosure level constant), and an indirect effect capturing how an increase in the quality
level alters the firm’s choice of disclosure level. The direct effect is always positive, while
the sign of the indirect effect depends on whether the firm’s optimal disclosure level
increases or decreases in response to an increase in quality. This indirect effect is weakly
positive if the firm weakly decreases its disclosure level when quality level is increased
(starting from q = q˜M), i.e., if
∂dM
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
≤ 0.
In this case, the overall effect of a marginal increase in quality (starting from the
unregulated level) on social welfare is unambiguously positive, which implies that it is
strictly socially desirable to set a minimum quality requirement (under our regularity
conditions). However, if
∂dM
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
> 0,
the indirect effect is negative and, therefore, the overall effect of a minimum quality
requirement is a priori ambiguous. The following lemma relates the effect of a change
in quality level on the firm’s optimal disclosure level to the cross-effect of quality and
disclosure on the firm’s profit.
Lemma 7 (Effect of the quality level on disclosure) If dM (q) ∈ (0, 1), then
∂dM
∂q
= −
∂2Π˜
∂q∂d
(
q, dM (q)
)
∂2Π˜
∂d2
(q, dM (q))
.
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.
From Lemma 7, we see that the effect of a change in disclosure level on the firm’s
choice of quality has the same sign as the cross-effect of quality and disclosure on the
firm’s profit.56
We now study the sign of the effect of a change in quality level on disclosure, which
in turn determines the sign of the indirect effect of a minimum quality level.
We first focus on the scenario in which the market is fully covered, and then turn
to the scenario in which the market is partially covered.
C.1 Full market coverage
Suppose that θ˜
(
q, dM(q)
)
= θ¯ for any q ∈ [0, q¯]. Under this assumption, the market is
fully covered whatever the regulator’s decision in the first stage of the game.
Consider the firm’s optimal choice of disclosure for a given level of quality. The firm’s
marginal benefit from increasing disclosure is given by (4), with the term capturing the
effect of disclosure on the extensive margin effect equal to zero (due to full market
coverage). Under the assumption that the firm’s optimal choice of disclosure level,
dM(q), is interior for any quality level q (in the relevant range), which we make in this
extension, Lemma 7 implies that
∂dM
∂q
= −
∂2Π˜
∂q∂d
(
q, dM (q)
)
∂2Π˜
∂d2
(q, dM (q))
= − rγ
∂2Π˜
∂d2
(q, dM (q))
> 0.
Therefore, the firm’s optimal level of quality is increasing in the level of disclosure. This
leads to the following result.
Proposition 7 (Effect of an ex ante minimum quality requirement on disclosure under
full market coverage) When the market is fully covered, a binding minimum quality
requirement q ∈ (q˜M , q¯] leads to an increase in the disclosure level chosen by the firm.
Let us now study the social desirability of a minimum quality requirement. Recall
that it is strictly optimal for the regulator to set such a requirement if and only if
∂Wˇ
∂q
∣∣∣
q=q˜M
> 0. The social marginal benefit of increasing the quality level, evaluated at
56We use the fact that ∂
2Π˜
∂d2
(
q, dM (q)
)
< 0, which is given by the second-order condition of the
maximization of Π˜ (q, d) with respect to d.
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q = q˜M , is
∂Wˇ
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
=
θ˜(q˜M ,d˜M)∫
θ
∂V
∂q
(
x˜
(
θ, q˜M , d˜M
)
, q˜M
)
f (θ) dθ−
θ˜(q˜M ,d˜M)∫
θ
θx˜
(
θ, q˜M , d˜M
) ∂dM
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
f (θ) dθ.
Let
γˇ = sup
{
γ′ > 0| ∂Wˇ
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜M
> 0 for all γ < γ′
}
.
Using the fact that ∂Wˇ
∂q
∣∣∣
q=q˜M
is continuous in γ and (strictly) positive when γ → 0, it
follows that γˇ is well defined in R++∪{+∞}. By definition of γˇ, we obtain that setting
a minimum quality requirement is socially desirable when γ < γˇ. Thus, a minimum
quality requirement is socially desirable whenever the complementarity between quality
and information is not too strong. When quality and information are sufficiently strong
complements (i.e., γ > γˇ), the sign of ∂Wˇ
∂q
∣∣∣
q=q˜M
is ambiguous and, therefore, so is the
impact of a minimum quality requirement on social welfare. The following proposition
summarizes the above analysis.
Proposition 8 (Social desirability of an ex ante minimum quality requirement under
full market coverage) When the market is fully covered, an ex ante regulation taking
the form of a minimum quality requirement is socially desirable if the complementarity
between quality and information is not too strong (i.e., γ < γˇ). Otherwise, such a
regulation may be not be socially desirable.
C.2 Partial market coverage
We now assume that θ˜
(
q, dM(q)
)
< θ¯ for any q ∈ [0, q¯]. Under this assumption, the
market is only partially covered whatever the regulator’s decision in the first stage of
the game. The sign of the effect of a higher quality on the firm’s optimal disclosure
level is given by the sign of the cross-effect ∂
2Π˜
∂q∂d
, which has already been studied in the
analysis of the disclosure regulation. Therefore, we get the following result which is the
counterpart of Proposition 3 when the authority regulates quality instead of privacy.
Proposition 9 (Effect of an ex ante minimum quality requirement on disclosure under
partial market coverage) Assume that the market is partially covered.
- If F (.) is weakly convex, a minimum quality requirement q ∈ (q˜M , q¯] leads to a
lower disclosure level.
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- If F (.) is concave and relatively inelastic, a minimum quality requirement q ∈(
q˜M , q¯
]
leads to a higher disclosure level.
- If F (.) is concave and relatively elastic, the effect of a minimum quality require-
ment q ∈ (q˜M , q¯] is negative if quality and information are weak complements, and is
ambiguous otherwise.
Combining Proposition 9 with the fact that the direct effect of a minimum quality
requirement on social welfare is always positive, we arrive at the following result.
Proposition 10 (Social desirability of an ex ante minimum quality requirement under
partial market coverage) Assume that the market is partially covered.
- If the distribution of the idiosyncratic privacy cost exhibits a weakly increasing
density function (i.e., F (.) is weakly convex), a regulation taking the form of a binding
minimum quality requirement is strictly socially desirable.
- If the distribution of the idiosyncratic privacy cost exhibits a decreasing density
function (i.e., F (.) is concave), a regulation taking the form of a binding minimum
quality requirement may not be socially desirable.
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